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CARDOZO LAW REVIEW

CAPITAL-SENTENCING LAW AND THE NEW
CONSERVATIVE COURT
Why Both Death-Penalty Abolitionists and Proponents Should Defend
Most Capital-Sentencing Doctrines
Scott W. Howe†

With the Supreme Court now dominated by a solidly conservative majority,
recent, well-grounded hopes for prompt judicial abolition of the death penalty have
vanished. Furthermore, existing Eighth Amendment doctrines that limit the death
penalty could be in jeopardy. Historically, many advocates for abolition have
criticized these doctrines. They claim that the Eighth Amendment prohibition on
Cruel and Unusual Punishments requires “consistency” in capital selection and that
current capital-sentencing doctrines do not satisfy—and sometimes conflict with—
this requirement. However, these advocates failed to anticipate the need to defend
these doctrines should judicial abolition become an impossibility and the rollingback of current limitations become a distinct possibility. And that is where we are
today.
This essay aims to show that the true core of what the Eighth Amendment
demands is not consistency but a “deserts-limitation”—a requirement that no
person receive the death penalty who does not deserve it. That is a goal on which
even conservatives could agree. It is also a goal that many of the existing death
penalty doctrines help to fulfill. Thus, this essay aims to explain why a conservative
Court should not repudiate the heart of existing Eighth Amendment jurisprudence

† © 2018 Scott W. Howe. Frank L. Williams Professor of Criminal Law, Dale E. Fowler
School of Law, Chapman University. I gratefully acknowledge Keegan Stephan for exceptional
editing and advice. I also thank Jetty Maria Cascante Howe for assistance of the most fundamental
type.
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on capital selection.
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INTRODUCTION
Beginning in 2015, many proponents of abolishing the death penalty
dared to imagine that the Supreme Court might soon inflict a coup de
grâce to capital punishment.1 In Glossip v. Gross,2 Justice Stephen
Breyer, joined by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, issued an extraordinary
dissenting opinion calling for a categorical challenge to capital
punishment and laying out a variety of supporting arguments.3 Believing
that Justice Breyer was signaling that Justice Anthony Kennedy, who had
long been moderate on the death penalty,4 might be ready to provide the
fifth vote for abolition, anti-death penalty lawyers geared up to bring such
a challenge to the Court.5 When Justice Antonin Scalia died in February
2016, abolitionists became even more hopeful that judicial abolition was
near.6 After a Democratic president—if not Barack Obama, then his
1 See, e.g., Adam Liptak, Death Penalty Foes Split over Taking Issue to Supreme Court, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 3, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/04/us/politics/death-penalty-opponentssplit-over-taking-issue-to-supreme-court.html, archived at https://perma.cc/TM8D-DC76; Chris
Geidner, The Most Ambitious Effort Yet to Abolish the Death Penalty is Already Happening,
BUZZFEED NEWS (Nov. 8, 2015, 8:32 PM), https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/chrisgeidner/
the-most-ambitious-effort-yet-to-abolish-the-death-penalty-i, archived at https://perma.cc/236FVNBX.
2 135 S. Ct. 2726 (2015).
3 See id. at 2755–80 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
4 See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578–79 (2005) (Kennedy, J., writing for the 5-4
majority, held that sentencing people to death for crimes they committed before the age of 18
categorically violates the Eighth Amendment prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments).
5 See supra note 1.
6 See, e.g., CAROL S. STEIKER & JORDAN M. STEIKER, COURTING DEATH: THE SUPREME
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expected Democratic successor, Hillary Clinton—appointed a liberal
Justice to replace the conservative Justice Scalia, abolitionists believed
there might be five Justices ready to declare the death penalty
unconstitutional even without Justice Kennedy.7
But, alas, it was not to be. After the Republican majority in the
Senate stalled on Obama’s nominee, Merrick Garland, and Republican
Donald Trump’s surprising victory over Hillary Clinton for the
presidency, Justice Scalia was replaced by Justice Neil Gorsuch, who is
expected to interpret the Eighth Amendment narrowly.8 The basis for
hope was not lost, but it was back to a five-vote victory dependent on
Justice Kennedy. However, in 2018, even those dreams evaporated when
Justice Kennedy announced his retirement.9 With the appointment of
Justice Brett Kavanaugh, a solid conservative, to replace him, there is no
longer any basis to believe that there are five votes to promptly end the
death penalty.10
The central question now about the Supreme Court and capital
punishment is whether the story will turn decidedly negative for those
who had hoped the Court would abolish the sanction. With five
conservative Justices, abolitionists may fear that the Court will roll-back
regulations on when states can impose death sentences. In its most
pronounced form, conservative change could mean abandoning the
“individualized sentencing” doctrine from Woodson v. North Carolina,11
which requires states to conduct a separate sentencing trial in capital
cases.12 In softer form, change could involve allowing mandatory death
penalties in certain extreme cases and limiting the evidentiary breadth of
the individualized-sentencing rule, which the Court described
expansively in Lockett v. Ohio.13 Along with abandoning or limiting the
individualization doctrine, conservative change could involve
overturning one or more of the Court’s “proportionality” rulings that
COURT AND CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 258 (2016).
7 See id. at 270.
8 See Adam Liptak & Matt Flegenheimer, Neil Gorsuch Confirmed by Senate as Supreme
Court Justice, N.Y. TIMES (April 7, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/07/us/politics/neilgorsuch-supreme-court.html, archived at https://perma.cc/G3EX-ETS3.
9 See Michael D. Shear, Supreme Court Justice Anthony Kennedy Will Retire, N.Y. TIMES
(June 27, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/27/us/politics/anthony-kennedy-retiresupreme-court.html, archived at https://perma.cc/2J48-765S.
10 See Richard Wolf, Abortion, Race, Gay Rights, Death Penalty: Supreme Court Nominee
Brett Kavanaugh Could Make the Difference, USA TODAY (Aug. 19, 2018), https://
www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2018/08/19/abortion-crime-race-gays-areas-where-brettkavanaugh-matters/1008303002, archived at https://perma.cc/WE3C-AURW (noting that Justice
Kavanaugh’s prior statements suggest he will be more conservative on the death penalty than was
Justice Kennedy).
11 428 U.S. 280 (1976) (plurality opinion).
12 Id. at 304–05; see also Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 335–36 (1976) (plurality opinion)
(striking down Louisiana’s mandatory death-penalty statute).
13 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (plurality opinion). For more on Lockett, see infra notes 33–54 and
accompanying text.
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categorically limit the use of the death penalty for some types of crimes
and some types of offenders, such as minors.14 The most vulnerable
example may be Kennedy v. Louisiana,15 in which the Court categorically
rejected the death penalty for child rape.16
While conservatives have plausible reasons to roll back those
doctrines, I offer a retributive argument that is decidedly non-liberal for
the Court to substantially retain them. My argument does not focus on an
originalist approach to interpreting the Cruel and Unusual Punishments
Clause.17 Since 1958, in Trop v. Dulles,18 the Court has consistently
purported to interpret the clause according to “evolving standards of
decency,”19 and I accept that methodology. Even so, I contend that the
Court should reject as implausible the commonly repeated rhetoric that
the clause mandates consistency in the use of the death penalty.20 The
Court’s Eighth Amendment doctrines on capital sentencing support only
a single, more modest goal—that no person should receive the death
penalty who does not deserve it, a concept I call the “deserts-limitation.”21
Believing this deserts-limitation to be a sensible understanding of how
the Eighth Amendment applies to capital punishment, I urge
conservatives to accept it and acknowledge that, in the main, current
doctrines on “individualized sentencing” and “proportionality” serve it.
I.

THE TRUE COMMAND OF THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT: CONSISTENCY OR
A DESERTS-LIMITATION?

The Eighth Amendment as it applies to capital selection is simply
about ensuring that no person receives the death penalty who does not
14 See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005) (barring the death penalty for juvenile
offenders); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002) (barring the death penalty for intellectually
disabled offenders).
15 554 U.S. 407 (2008).
16 See id. at 413.
17 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII, cl. 3. The clause’s original meaning is contested among those who
have tried to identify it, with some claiming that the clause was understood to prohibit only certain
modes of punishment, others claiming more broadly that it was understood to prohibit
disproportional or discriminatory punishments, and others claiming that the effort to identify an
original meaning was inconclusive. See Scott W. Howe, Furman’s Mythical Mandate, 40 U. MICH.
J.L. REFORM 435, 461 n.135 (2007).
18 356 U.S. 86 (1958) (plurality opinion).
19 See, e.g., Atkins v. Virginia 536 U.S. 304, 311–12 (2002) (quoting Trop, 356 U.S. at 101
(plurality opinion)).
20 See, e.g., California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 541 (1987) (asserting the need to avoid
“arbitrary and unpredictable” death sentences); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 111 (1982)
(asserting the goal of “measured, consistent application” of the death penalty).
21 I have presented this view several times previously. See, e.g., Scott W. Howe, Repudiating
the Narrowing Rule in Capital Sentencing, 2012 BYU L. REV. 1477, 1481–82 [hereinafter Howe,
Repudiating the Narrowing Rule]; Scott W. Howe, The Failed Case for Eighth Amendment
Regulation of the Capital-Sentencing Trial, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 795, 797 (1998) [hereinafter Howe,
The Failed Case].
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deserve it. As I have argued before, if consistency were the aspiration of
Eighth Amendment regulation, “a system involving unrelenting
harshness in the imposition of death sentences should succeed, while a
system giving officials discretion to extend merciful reprieves should
fail.”22 As Professor Randall Kennedy has noted, where race-of-victim
discrimination predominates, which is typical, a state could pursue
consistency by increasing the death-sentencing rate for killers of blacks
to match the death-sentencing rate for similarly-situated killers of
whites.23 Yet, the profound ironies in any view that the prohibition on
cruel and unusual punishments is indifferent between leveling up and
leveling down24 may help explain why the Court has not seriously
pursued the “consistency” view.25 The call for “consistency” has
essentially operated as only a rhetorical flourish,26 although one that has
obscured the first question to be addressed by the Eighth Amendment:
When is capital punishment appropriate for an individual offender? Only
after we answer that question should we ask the “consistency” question:
Must everyone for whom the death penalty is appropriate receive it? We
will see that the answers reflected in capital-sentencing doctrines are that
the death penalty is only appropriate under the Eighth Amendment when
an offender deserves it and the Eighth Amendment is not offended by
undeserved leniency.
II.

THE VALUE OF CAPITAL-SELECTION DOCTRINES IN PROTECTING
AGAINST UNDESERVED DEATH SENTENCES

In this Section, I aim to show that the core of existing capitalsentencing jurisprudence implements a deserts-limitation and that, even
for a conservative Court, it makes sense to honor that principle. The
individualized-sentencing and proportionality doctrines comprise the
core of capital-sentencing jurisprudence and conservatives should
concede that these doctrines have a plausible Eighth Amendment
explanation. At the same time, I concede that a conservative Court could
logically reject a less-important doctrine known as the “narrowing”
rule.27 Under that doctrine, a state must require the jury to find an
22
23

Howe, The Failed Case, supra note 21, at 824.
See, e.g., Randall L. Kennedy, McCleskey v. Kemp: Race, Capital Punishment and the
Supreme Court, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1388, 1392 (1988).
24 One “disturbing irony” is that it “might actually lead to the execution of more black
defendants.” Id.
25 Howe, The Failed Case, supra note 21, at 825 (noting the irony in the view that executing
more people would serve the Eighth Amendment).
26 See id. at 824–28.
27 See, e.g., Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163, 173–74 (2006) (asserting that a capital sentencing
system must “rationally narrow the class of death-eligible defendants”); see also LINDA E. CARTER,
ELLEN S. KREITZBERG & SCOTT W. HOWE, UNDERSTANDING CAPITAL PUNISHMENT LAW 143
(4th ed. 2018) (“Every death penalty statute must narrow the class of cases that are eligible for a
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“aggravating circumstance” to justify a death sentence, and the
circumstance must supposedly “genuinely narrow” the class of people
who may be subjected to the death penalty.28 The Court has rationalized
the narrowing rule as an effort to promote consistency.29 However, the
effort has accomplished little, if anything. And in any event, consistency
is not an Eighth Amendment aspiration that can justify regulation as
opposed to abolition.30 If any death penalty doctrine warrants repudiation,
it is the narrowing rule.
A.

Individualized-Sentencing Doctrine

The Supreme Court’s individualized-sentencing doctrine requires
states to conduct an expansive penalty trial—after conviction at the trial
on the merits—in all capital cases. This doctrine is central to what makes
death so much more difficult for states to impose and maintain on appeal
than a prison sentence. Regardless of how aggravating the circumstance
and narrowly defined the capital crime, the state must provide a separate
penalty trial31 at which the defendant has an opportunity to present
mitigating evidence to avoid capital punishment.32 According to Lockett,
the defendant must be free to present, and the sentencer must be free to
consider as a basis for reprieve, “any aspect of a defendant’s character or
record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant
proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death.”33 With the benefit of
this broad evidentiary standard,34 the best capital defense lawyers can
make a powerful case for sparing almost any defendant, if only so that
jurors can avoid the emotional weight for the rest of their lives of having
voted for the death penalty.35
sentence of death.”).
28 See, e.g., Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 776–80 (1990).
29 See, e.g., Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 436 (2008) (asserting that narrowing serves
to “ensure consistency in determining who receives a death sentence”).
30 See Howe, Repudiating the Narrowing Rule, supra note 21, at 1491–97.
31 The state must allow a jury to decide whether there exists an aggravating circumstance, a
requirement that most states fulfill at the sentencing stage, using a jury. See CARTER ET AL., supra
note 27, at 147. Whether a jury must decide the ultimate sentencing question remains uncertain,
although all states presently use a jury. See id. at 148.
32 In Sumner v. Shuman, 483 U.S. 66, 67, 85 (1987), the Court rejected a mandatory death
penalty even for a murder committed by an inmate serving a prison sentence of life without
possibility of parole.
33 438 U.S. at 604; see also id. at 620–21 (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment).
34 Although a capital defendant may not be able to present everything that he desires, the Court
“has liberally construed when evidence is relevant to the circumstances of the crime or the character
and record of the defendant.” CARTER ET AL., supra note 27, at 184.
35 The case of Brian Nichols provides an example. He was in custody and on trial in Atlanta
for rape when he overpowered a guard and murdered the trial judge, a court reporter, a sheriff’s
deputy and, later, a federal agent. Convicted of four counts of felony murder, among other crimes,
Nichols was represented by a strong legal team that convinced three members of the jury to spare
him from the death penalty. See Robbie Brown, In Georgia, Push to End Unanimity for Execution,
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The individualized-sentencing doctrine also makes death penalty
trials and appeals expensive and slow. Jury selection is protracted
because of the requirement to discover and excuse jurors whose views on
the death penalty would prevent them from being fair to both sides at
sentencing.36 The sentencing trial itself can also become extended where
defense counsel and the prosecutors present many witnesses. And
because of that sentencing trial, many additional issues arise, which can
extend the appellate litigation and sometimes require a new sentencing
hearing.37 The rarity of capital-sentencing trials exacerbates those effects
because neither judges, prosecutors, nor defense attorneys have typically
tried many capital cases to a sentencing verdict and thus make more
errors. Many of those complications might disappear if states could
simply impose a mandatory death penalty upon conviction of certain
crimes.
Putting aside policy considerations, the Eighth Amendment
grounding for requiring the sentencing trial and imposing the expansive
Lockett rule38 is also questionable. The most plausible explanation is that
the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause39 imposes a deserts-limitation
on the use of the death penalty. The sentencing trial is not suited to
resolving the utilitarian question of crime deterrence. That issue is one
for legislatures to decide on a categorical basis rather than sentencers to
decide in individual cases, particularly when the sentencers receive no
relevant data about the deterrent effects of capital punishment generally.40
Moreover, the aim could not be to ensure “consistency” or “nonarbitrariness,” given that the ability of the jury under Lockett to extend
mercy41 and the absence of controls to limit reprieves at other stages of

N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 16, 2008), www.nytimes.com/2008/12/17/us/17death.html, archived at https://
perma.cc/UJ7D-26F6; Jeffrey Toobin, Death in Georgia, THE NEW YORKER (Feb. 4, 2008), https://
www.newyorker.com/magazine/2008/02/04/death-in-georgia, archived at https://perma.cc/36FYUXLB; see also BRANDON GARRETT, END OF ITS ROPE: HOW KILLING THE DEATH PENALTY CAN
REVIVE CRIMINAL JUSTICE 256–58 (2017) (discussing how legendary death penalty attorney David
Bruck helped secure a reprieve for Susan Smith in her South Carolina capital trial for the murder
of her two children).
36 See, e.g., Brown, supra note 35. (discussing anti-death penalty jurors who elude voir dire
about their willingness to consider the death penalty).
37 See, e.g., Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782 (2001) (reversing death sentence based on
confusing instructions given at second sentencing trial that was held after previous death sentence
was reversed based on error at the first sentencing trial).
38 See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
39 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII, cl. 3.
40 The evidence would not bear on the defendant’s character, record, or crime. See supra note
33 and accompanying text. If utilitarian interests, such as crime deterrence, were alone sufficient
to support a death sentence, the Court could not logically reject a legislature’s decision to follow a
categorical approach, focusing on deterrence of other putative criminals, and to eschew an
individualized approach, focusing on the deterrence of the individual capital defendant. Nothing in
the Eighth Amendment proscription seems to favor one kind of utilitarian justification for
punishment over another.
41 See supra notes 33–35 and accompanying text.
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the selection process promotes inconsistency.42
Yet the defect is not with the idea that a jury should spare any
defendant who does not deserve death. In theory, that idea makes sense
under the Eighth Amendment because it probably comports with the
societal consensus about justice. The conundrum arises because the Court
cannot specify with much precision when a death sentence is deserved
because there is no clear societal consensus on this issue. The Lockett rule
punts on that problem by merely articulating a broad definition of what
evidence a jury may consider when deciding to impose the death sentence
without clarifying what issue the sentencer is to resolve, and by what
standards, based on that evidence.43 Should jurors sentence only the most
culpable offenders to death? Should they spare those who have done
many good acts in the past but are extremely culpable for their charged
crime? Under the current doctrine, it is unclear. As the doctrine stands,
jurors can impose death based on concepts as abstract and unproven as a
prosecutor’s plea that if they do so it will deter future crime by other
offenders.44 Because of this weakness in the doctrine, if consensus
quickly dissolves over how to refine the deserts-measures, it is unclear
why the Court should reject legislative judgments about how to structure
the capital-sentencing decision, even if they seek to impose automatic
death sentences for some crimes.
Logically, the Court could achieve the goal by relying on the
“proportionality” doctrine, discussed below, and eliminating the
individualized-sentencing doctrine completely. A conservative Court
could articulate some basic protections that it thinks reflect the societal
consensus about deserts, such as a rule that minors should not receive the
death penalty, and, with those protections in place, it could avoid
claiming that the Eighth Amendment tells states how to run capitalsentencing trials. If legislators conclude, for example, that a prisoner
serving life imprisonment without the possibility of parole who kills a
prison guard should receive a death sentence automatically, the Court
could abstain from interfering. Indeed, why should the Court, when
unable to explain the precise problem, rule that jurors hearing the Lockett
evidence are, mysteriously, more appropriate decision-makers than
legislatures to resolve not only whether the offender fits in the category
of the deserving but also how that category should be defined?
There are also good reasons to criticize the breadth of Lockett’s
evidentiary mandate. Allowing offenders to present anything about their
character, record, or crime potentially makes the sentencing inquiry not
42 See Howe, The Failed Case, supra note 21, at 811–23. See also STUART BANNER, THE
DEATH PENALTY: AN AMERICAN HISTORY 288 (2002) (noting many arbitrary factors that influence
the capital-sentencing process).
43 See supra notes 33–35 and accompanying text.
44 See WELSH S. WHITE, THE DEATH PENALTY IN THE NINETIES 115–16 (1991) (noting that
prosecutors argue in favor of the death penalty on both deterrence and retribution rationales and
discussing some common arguments relating to deterrence that they employ).
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just about their “culpability” for their capital offences but also, or instead,
about their “general-deserts” based on all of their life’s works.45 Under
Lockett, the Court has held that capital defendants are free to introduce
sentencing evidence about their life that lacks a “nexus” to their capital
crimes.46 The defendant was good with dogs as a child. He was nice to
his siblings. He displayed talent and dedication in his middle-school art
class. Is such evidence relevant? There is doubt whether a societal
consensus exists that the offender’s positive attributes and good deeds
should matter rather than only his moral responsibility for an act of
homicidal brutality. Lockett arguably goes too far.47
However, despite all of these plausible reasons to roll-back the
individualized-sentencing doctrine, there are also reasons for even
conservatives to favor retaining the doctrine largely as it is. First, there is
a wide range in the culpability of those who commit murder and thus are
subject to the death penalty. Murder includes many unintentional
killings,48 and even many people convicted of murder who intended to
kill are mentally ill or impaired.49 The culpability range has gotten
modestly narrower in recent years due to the Court’s proportionality
decisions. In the new millennium, for example, the Court has
categorically shielded intellectually disabled people50 and juveniles51
from capital punishment. Those decisions arguably help protect against
some undeserved death sentences on the view that almost all members of
those groups fall on the very low end of the culpability spectrum. Yet, the
Court has not done much more with the proportionality doctrine in
capital-murder cases, and without rulings that protect more people
convicted of murder who have diminished culpability, the individualized45 See, e.g., Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 U.S. 393, 397–99 (1987) (reversing death sentence
because list of mitigating factors in the Florida statute, when viewed by the trial judge as exclusive,
prevented consideration of, among other things, evidence that defendant had been a “fond and
affectionate uncle”).
46 See Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274, 283–86, 289 (2004) (rejecting lower court test that
required, inter alia, that evidence, to be mitigating, have a nexus to the capital crime); Skipper v.
South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 5 (1986) (reversing death sentence based on exclusion from sentencer
consideration of defendant’s good conduct in jail, although “it did not relate specifically to
petitioner’s culpability for the crime he committed”).
47 Commentators have disagreed on this issue. See Howe, The Failed Case, supra note 21, at
838 n.167.
48 See, e.g., Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 158 (1987) (rejecting claim that the death penalty
is disproportionate for one who neither intended to kill nor actually killed and ruling that “major
participation in the felony committed, combined with reckless indifference to human life” is enough
for the death penalty to apply).
49 Regarding the impairments of capital offenders, see Craig Haney, The Social Context of
Capital Murder: Social Histories and the Logic of Mitigation, 35 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 547, 609
(1995) (contending that capital offenders often have suffered from “family poverty and deprivation,
childhood neglect, emotional and physical abuse,” and “institutional failure and mistreatment in
the juvenile and adult correctional system[,]” and that evidence of their social histories can help
juries better understand them as humans).
50 See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002).
51 See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578–79 (2005).
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sentencing doctrine arguably remains crucial. Before the need for
individualized sentencing would conceivably disappear, the Court would
have to shield people convicted of murder who are seriously mentally ill
and who are guilty but lacked an intent to kill.52 Without those
protections, allowing defendants to plead their low culpability to a
sentencing jury could still help avoid the imposition of the death sanction
on the undeserving. We cannot be sure. Juries may not consistently honor
evidence of low culpability, given that they are not required to give it any
weight and are not told that the ultimate issue concerns “deserts,” even
with individualized-sentencing rules in place.53 Nonetheless, if juries
regularly do weigh such evidence in focusing on deserts, that helps
protect against death sentences that amount to retributive excess.
Whether we should maintain the broad Lockett test of relevant
evidence covering general-deserts is more debatable, but it might also
help to avoid undeserved death sentences. One can see why that is so by
asking whether prosecutors should have the chance to present the
offender’s record of unrelated crimes and convictions. Many of us,
perhaps most, would probably think this evidence relevant to what the
offender “deserves,” even if, given the alternative of life imprisonment
without parole, we do not need to worry about social protection. But why
are all of an offender’s other unrelated crimes relevant to their culpability
for the charged crime? There is no compelling explanation. Also, from
the defense perspective, what if a capital defendant who is incarcerated
pending trial steps in to save a guard from attack by risking their own
life? Or what if that capital defendant acted heroically during war-time
military service? In Porter v. McCollum,54 the Supreme Court reversed a
death sentence for ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to
investigate and present at sentencing, among other things, evidence of
Porter’s heroic military service in the Korean War.55 Is that evidence
relevant to whether an offender “deserves” the death penalty? Maybe
most of us, including most conservatives, would say yes, although the
information has nothing to do with his culpability for the capital crime.
Those examples suggest that general-deserts is a measure we care about,
suggesting that the Lockett test is correct.

52 Despite the addition of such proportionality protections, impairments reducing the
culpability of some capital offenders that could not be considered absent individualized sentencing
would arguably remain. See Haney, supra note 49, at 609.
53 See, e.g., Jordan M. Steiker, The Limits of Legal Language: Decisionmaking in Capital
Cases, 94 MICH. L. REV. 259, 259 (1996) (contending that states should tell capital-sentencing
juries, among other things, that the death penalty is reserved only for offenders who deserve it).
54 558 U.S. 30 (2009) (per curiam).
55 See id. at 43–44 (declaring the evidence significant because it reflected impressive military
service in addition to substantiating a source of Porter’s subsequent mental and emotional
struggles).
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Proportionality Doctrine

The Supreme Court’s capital-proportionality doctrine holds that the
Eighth Amendment categorically prohibits the death penalty for some
offenses, such as rape, and some offenders, such as the intellectually
disabled.56 The existence of the individualized-sentencing doctrine may
be reason enough for the Court not to have categorically protected any
group of capital offenders through this proportionality doctrine. Both the
individualized-sentencing and proportionality doctrines aim to help
ensure that no person receives the death penalty who does not deserve it.
Yet the imposition of categorical barriers reflects a lack of trust in juries
in individual cases to get the deserts-determination correct. Conservatives
could plausibly conclude that at least a few people convicted of murder
who are, for example, intellectually disabled or under eighteen, deserve
the death penalty. Nonetheless, the Court has shielded from the death
penalty everyone in those groups. The Court has also prohibited the death
penalty for crimes on the fringes of the felony-murder doctrine,57 and all
non-homicide crimes against individual persons, even child rape.58
Conservatives who accept the deserts-limitation could plausibly reject all
of those decisions on grounds that the individualized-sentencing doctrine
correctly allows a more discriminating approach.
Conservatives could also plausibly object to some of the Court’s
proportionality rulings more than others. Probably the most objectionable
is the Court’s protection of adults convicted of raping children in
Kennedy.59 Rape of a child under the age of twelve, as the Louisiana
statute proscribed,60 can easily be considered as heinous as an act of
murder that could carry the death penalty. Such a crime is typically
calculated, and the harm to the victim is potentially severe. The Court
was testing the limits of its credibility in claiming a societal consensus
against the death sanction in all such cases. Even President Obama, as a
candidate, said that he disagreed with the Court’s decision in Kennedy.61
56 See, e.g., Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002) (ruling the death penalty
disproportionate for intellectually disabled defendants); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 600
(1977) (ruling the death penalty disproportionate for rape of an adult);.
57 In Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982), the Court exempted an accomplice in a felony
murder who had not himself killed nor attempted to kill the victim. Id. at 798, 801. In Tison v.
Arizona, 481 U.S. 137 (1987), the Court cut back on the protection, ruling that “major participation
in the felony committed, combined with reckless indifference to human life” was sufficient for the
death penalty to apply. Id. at 158.
58 In Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407 (2008), the Court not only exempted adults convicted
of raping children but stated that as “to crimes against individuals . . . the death penalty should not
be expanded to instances where the victim’s life was not taken.” Id. at 437.
59 See id. at 407.
60 See id. at 416.
61 Linda Greenhouse, Justices Bar Death Penalty for the Rape of a Child, N.Y. TIMES (June
26, 2008), https://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/26/washington/26scotus.html, archived at https://
perma.cc/6MN4-GYRT.
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On the whole, however, the Court’s proportionality rulings arguably
do appropriately protect against undeserved death sentences. The Court
has only categorically shielded a small portion of people convicted of
murder from a possible death sentence, and they are generally on the very
low end of the culpability spectrum, which, overall, furthers a desertslimitation. For example, even if culpability should be the primary desertslimitation, and one believes that a small number of intellectually disabled
people convicted of murder are culpable enough to deserve death, there
is still great difficulty in determining which ones they are, even with the
best expert assistance and top-notch defense counsel. Relegating all of
those offenders to imprisonment for life without parole avoids deathpenalty mistakes without much cost.62 Conservatives who are charitable
could agree.
There is also strong evidence that decisionmakers sometimes err on
desert-judgments due to racial bias when given the death option in certain
kinds of cases involving defendants of marginal culpability. The
historical data on the racialized use of the death penalty for rape of adult
victims, where consent and mistake as to consent are possible defenses,
makes this point. From 1930, when national statistics began to be kept,
to 1972, when the Court struck down standardless systems of imposing
the death penalty in Furman v. Georgia,63 405, or eighty-nine percent, of
the 455 men executed for rape were African-American, and “virtually
all . . . were accused of raping white women.”64 At the same time, it
appears that “no white man has ever been executed for raping a black
victim.”65 Those statistics imply mistakes in desert-judgments based on
racial prejudice, which surely helps explain why the Court, in Coker v.
Georgia,66 declared the death penalty disproportionate punishment for
the rape of an adult victim,67 although it avoided discussing the racialbias problem.68
This potential for error based on racial bias might also be a reason
never to allow the death penalty for child rape.69 The argument may be
more tenuous than for adult rape. Rapes of very young children by adults
are arguably more consistently despicable than rapes of adults in that a
62 Regarding the relative costs of the death penalty compared to life imprisonment without
parole, see CARTER ET AL., supra note 27, at 20–23 (noting that “existing studies suggest that a
death penalty system may be more expensive from a total-cost perspective than a system with a
maximum punishment of life imprisonment without parole”).
63 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
64 Sheri Lynn Johnson, Coker v. Georgia: Of Rape, Race, and Burying the Past, in DEATH
PENALTY STORIES 171, 193 (John H. Blume & Jordan M. Steiker, eds. 2009).
65 Id.
66 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
67 Id. at 597, 600
68 See Johnson, supra note 64, at 179–83.
69 In Kennedy, the Court effectively acknowledged this concern when it conceded “no
confidence” that use of the death penalty to punish child rape could avoid the arbitrariness problem
that the Court faced in Furman. 554 U.S. 407, 439 (2008).
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heinous level of wrongdoing is almost always premeditated and without
a plausible defense of mistake regarding consent. On the other hand, the
level of violence and trauma involved can still vary widely with child
rape, leaving plenty of space for racial biases to operate, and thus, to
produce erroneous death sentences. On that view, Kennedy70 was correct.
But, if a conservative Court were to disagree, it should at least not
overrule Kennedy71 unless it leaves the individualized-sentencing
doctrine largely intact.
C.

The Narrowing Rule

The Supreme Court’s narrowing rule requires that states articulate
“aggravating circumstances” and that the capital-sentencer find at least
one aggravating circumstance present in order to impose a death
sentence.72 This rule warrants repudiation more than any other aspect of
capital-sentencing law. This “narrowing” doctrine arose under the
pretense of being required by Furman’s purported call for nonarbitrariness in capital sentencing when, in 1976, the Court upheld three
new capital-sentencing statutes that actually allowed for arbitrariness.73
In upholding those statutes as constitutional, the Court pointed to
provisions in the statutes that required an aggravating circumstance in
order to impose a death sentence. The Court claimed that these provisions
showed that the statutes promoted consistency.74 This narrowing rule, and
the ideal of consistency that purportedly underlies it, could be seen as
justification for rolling-back the individualized sentencing doctrine.
Because such narrowing categorically—and through legislation—limits
who is subject to the death penalty, the argument goes, individual
sentencing is less critical to ensure that only the deserving receive the
death penalty.
But the proposition that the narrowing rule actually promotes this
goal is wildly unrealistic. For example, Georgia’s statute75 was one of
those under scrutiny, and with ten statutory aggravating circumstances
70
71
72

Id.
Id.
See, e.g., Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 361–63 (1988); Godfrey v. Georgia, 446
U.S. 420, 428–29 (1980) (plurality opinion);.
73 See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 198, 207 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell, & Stevens,
JJ.); id. at 222, 226 (White, J., Burger, C.J., & Rehnquist, J. concurring in the judgment); Proffitt
v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 251–53, 259–60 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell, & Stevens, JJ.); id.
at 260–61 (White, J., Burger, C.J., & Rehnquist, J. concurring in the judgment); Jurek v. Texas,
428 U.S. 262, 276–77 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell, & Stevens, JJ.); id. at 278–79 (White,
J., Burger, C.J., & Rehnquist, J. concurring in the judgment).
74 See Howe, Repudiating the Narrowing Rule, supra note 21, at 1486–88 (discussing the
opinions).
75 For the language of the statute as it appeared at the time, see Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S.
153, 165 n. 9 (1976) (plurality opinion). For the language of the Georgia statute today, see O.C.G.A.
§ 17-10-30 (2010).
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that together covered almost all murders,76 no serious narrowing
occurred.77
To be sure, individualized sentencing also conflicts with the goal of
achieving consistency in capital sentencing because individual juries still
decide who receives the death penalty and who does not. However, this
argument is a red herring. As we have seen, the Eighth Amendment as a
regulatory tool is about a substantive standard—the deserts-limitation—
not the idea that there is justice in equality. The Court has never required
that sentencing systems limit the articulation of aggravating
circumstances.78 For nearly three decades, the Court has declined to
require that individual aggravating circumstances genuinely narrow who
is subjected to the death penalty.79 That means there is still no meaningful
narrowing required. The Court’s reluctance to demand substantial
narrowing makes sense if the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause80
regulates capital sentencing simply by revealing a substantive standard
that only the deserving should receive the death sanction.
On that view, conservatives should not use the purported “equality”
mandate of Furman as a reason to neuter the individualized-sentencing
doctrine. It would be more consistent with the deserts-limitation to
repudiate the idea that the Eighth Amendment demands consistency and,
thus, eliminate the narrowing rule.
III. SYMBOLISM AND OTHER FORCES FAVORING THE STATUS QUO
Death sentences have become increasingly uncommon since the
1990s,81 and there may be few, if any, states that want to revert to a robust
use of the sanction. The penalty brings problems beyond those caused by
Supreme Court regulation that make its use, except in the most
extraordinary cases, a questionable policy. For example, concerns about
the conviction and condemnation of innocent persons helped convince
New Mexico officials to abolish the death penalty in 200982 and Illinois
76
77

See Howe, Repudiating the Narrowing Rule, supra note 21, at 1493–94 & n. 109.
See EVAN J. MANDERY, A WILD JUSTICE: THE DEATH AND RESURRECTION OF CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA 362 (2013).
78 See STEIKER & STEIKER, supra note 6, at 160 (“Though the Court goes through the motions
of assessing whether individual aggravators narrow the class of death-eligible offenders, the Court
has never inquired whether aggravating factors taken collectively accomplish anything along those
lines.”).
79 See Howe, Repudiating the Narrowing Rule, supra note 21, at 1492–93 (noting that the Court
has not demanded that individual aggravators narrow the group of death-eligible offenders in any
meaningful sense).
80 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII, cl. 3.
81 See DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., FACTS ABOUT THE DEATH PENALTY, https://
deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/FactSheet.pdf (last updated Aug. 14, 2018), archived at https://
perma.cc/CJ5U-2GX9 (revealing that annual death sentences dropped from 295 in 1998 to 39 in
2017).
82 See CARTER ET AL., supra note 27, at 485.
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officials to do so in 2011.83 Studies in many states have also revealed
evidence of race-based prosecutorial decision-making at stages other than
sentencing.84 There is also doubt that the death sentence deters crime
more than a life sentence without the possibility of parole.85 Those kinds
of concerns favor avoiding the death penalty. States may thus see benefits
in providing a separate sentencing trial and in following Lockett’s broad
evidentiary standard, even if not required to do so by the Supreme Court.
We should not forget that in the pre-Furman era, the movement among
states had been toward allowing a separate and expansive capitalsentencing inquiry.86 To the extent that such views hold sway today, there
may be few, if any, states that will ask the Court to significantly roll-back
restrictions on the death penalty.
If only a small number of states seek to overturn doctrines favorable
to capital defendants, a conservative Court majority might decline to
reverse course because there is little to be gained and more to be lost. As
we have seen, the Court’s capital-sentencing law generally can be
understood to serve an Eighth Amendment goal of ensuring that only the
most deserving offenders suffer the death penalty. While that is far from
perfect justice to those conservatives who believe that many who deserve
the sanction gain reprieves, it is a worthwhile form of justice nonetheless.
The symbolism of the death penalty also remains sharply disputed.
Capital-sentencing law is in some sense like a contested monument in a
corner of a town square. One group sees white supremacy, while another
sees the American dream. For some, it represents a history of racial
oppression and savagery. For others, it represents the idea that by our
good and bad deeds the world will know us and we might get what we
deserve. The Court’s work on capital-sentencing doctrines since the
1960s may have had only a modest influence in promoting fairness and
thus influencing the debate about the meaning of the death penalty.
83 See Rob Warden, How and Why Illinois Abolished the Death Penalty, 30 L. & INEQUALITY
245 (2012).
84 See, e.g., Scott Phillips, Racial Disparities in the Capital of Capital Punishment, 45 HOUS.
L. REV. 807, 829–39 (2008) (finding that Harris County, Texas prosecutors exhibited race-based
decision-making in pursuing capital trials). For additional studies finding race-based decision
making by capital prosecutors in other states, see Scott W. Howe, Race, Death and
Disproportionality, 37 N. KY. L. REV. 213, 226 n.86 (2010).
85 See CARTER ET AL., supra note 27, at 10–14. There is also doubt that the death sanction is
more retributive than life imprisonment. See, e.g., Douglas Mossman, The Psychiatrist and
Execution Competency: Fording Murky Ethical Waters, 43 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1, 58 n.231
(1992) (expressing doubt on the question and noting that several prominent commentators “have
viewed life imprisonment as a worse fate than death”). However, this doubt cuts both for and
against avoidance of the death penalty, as reflected in a dispute on that point between Justice Breyer
and Justice Scalia in Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726 (2015). Compare id. at 2769 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that the death penalty’s lack of marginal punitive force over life imprisonment
without parole favors abolition) with id. at 2748 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“My goodness. If he thinks
the death penalty not much more harsh (and hence not much more retributive), why is he so keen
to get rid of it?”).
86 See Howe, The Failed Case, supra note 21, at 842 n.181.
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Nonetheless, the Court’s restrictions on the death sanction have been
viewed as important constitutional reforms to many, and thus the Court
could receive substantial criticism for attempting to roll them back. And
as we have seen, these existing restrictions generally further the
fundamental goal of the Eighth Amendment. On that view, a conservative
Court may believe it has more important matters on which to weather the
controversy involved with backtracking on past decisions.
CONCLUSION
When viewed in its totality, the Supreme Court’s capital sentencing
jurisprudence reveals a motivating principle of ensuring that only
offenders who deserve the death penalty receive it. The doctrines that
have been developed under this jurisprudence may seem imperfect both
to those who believe that no one deserves the death penalty and to those
who believe that many people who deserve the death penalty evade it.
However, on whole, the Supreme Court’s current death penalty doctrines
help achieve a worthy goal. From an abolitionist perspective, it would be
a mistake to roll-back these protections and subject more people to the
death penalty in the name of consistency. And from a conservative
perspective, any attempt to roll-back these protections to capture more
offenders who they believe deserve the death penalty would not be worth
the political, symbolic, and human costs.

